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Abstract 
In this introduction to contemporary conceptions of time and change, I 
investigate what our experience of time, that is, our experience of change, seems 
to be and ask whether or not we can say that how it seems could match the 
reality. My conclusion is that more recent contemporary conceptions of time can 
do this but that more intuitive or traditional conceptions cannot. Thus, I conclude 
that the more contemporary conceptions are preferable for research into time-
consciousness. 
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Introduction1 
This paper surveys contemporary philosophical 
debates in the experience of time. Furthermore, 
although I provide a philosophical introduction, 
it is aimed at researchers interested in the 
mechanisms and structures of consciousness. 
The primary target is the existential 
commitments different conceptions of time have 
for our experience of time and where these 
conceptions and experience clash.  
There are discussions of this scattered 
throughout existing literature but only as part of 
other philosophical concerns (e.g. Dainton and 
Le Poidevin 2007). However, the topic is of 
interest in itself.  
Different conceptions of time make 
significant claims about what philosophers call 
ontology – what there is or, we might also say, 
what exists. Any model that explains some 
feature of the world must make ontological 
assumptions to do so e.g. if my explanation for a 
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whistling kettle is that the water in it has 
evaporated into steam then I assume that water 
and steam exist.  
This is as true of experience as of 
anything else. In order to explain our experience 
of something you must make assumptions about 
what exists. Since the manner in which one 
thinks of time imports certain presuppositions 
about what exists, then it also imports 
presuppositions about what can be experienced 
and about how that experience comes about.  
My discussion will proceed as follows:  
First, I discuss what might be meant by 
experiences (and contrast it with imagination, 
anticipations or illusions).  
Second, I outline the different 
conceptions of time, giving a brief explanation of 
why these alternative conceptions exist.  
Third, I discuss what might be meant by 
experiences of time. These tend to fall into two 
general types: perceptions of immediate change 
(and persistence) and experiences of the flow of 
time. 
By examining these views, I also examine 
contemporary philosophical theories of 
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experienced time; the most notable being 
retention theory (originating with the 
phenomenologist Edmund Husserl).  
Fourth, I examine some problems with 
these theories from what are sometimes called 
temporal illusions. I sketch some possible 
solutions to these. I then close with a comment 
on the validity of any evidence that shows we do 
not experience change. 
My main conclusion is that one’s account 
of experienced time depends on how we 
conceive time; and that, given research into 
consciousness, one might prefer the more 
contemporary conceptions. 
 
A Note on Quantum Theory 
I have entirely neglected quantum theory in this 
discussion. There is a very good reason for this. 
One of the (if not the most) difficult problems in 
current physicists is the unification of quantum 
theory and general relativity. Central to the 
problem is reconciling the dynamic concept in 
general relativity with the static concept in 
quantum theory. Currently, there is no agreed 
solution to how this ought to be resolved.2 As 
relativity is a significant factor in more 
contemporary conceptions of time, I will leave 
the relevance of quantum theory until there is 
such a resolution. 
 
1. Kinds of Experience  
Before proceeding, it is necessary to present 
some important assumptions about what I 
understand as experience. While these 
assumptions may seem trivial or even naïve, it is 
important to make them explicit to avoid 
confusion later on. 
I assume that experience is an 
awareness or consciousness of something and I 
assume that any non-conscious occurrence is not 
an experience. There are two (relatively, 
perhaps) unproblematic kinds of experience: 
perception and episodic memory (Le Poidevin 
2007); perception is the main kind of experience 
I consider here. 
There are others kinds of conscious 
awareness that one might want to call 
‘experience’; these are imagination (or 
                                               
2 Indeed, some recent theorists seem to deny time exists at all (e.g. 
Barbour).  
 
hallucination and/or illusion) and anticipation. 
However, I advise caution on this since there is a 
very important distinction between these, on 
the one hand, and perception and episodic 
memory, on the other.  
When we experience something, e.g. 
perceive something, that something is real. If it 
is not real, we might very well seem to 
experience it, but we do not actually experience 
it. Instead, we imagine it; or, we might say, we 
hallucinate it or are under an illusion. 
Importantly, should we experience anything in 
this case it is something else which does exist.  
To illustrate, consider the following 
story: I claim that, one night on the banks of 
Loch Ness, I experienced the Loch Ness monster 
thrashing in the water before me. If it is true that 
I experience what I seem to, then the Loch Ness 
monster exists. However, if there is no Loch Ness 
monster, then I only imagine the monster. In 
such cases, I may still experience something - a 
freak waterspout, an oversized otter, fatigue-
induced neural firing - but, whatever it is, it is 
not the (non-existing) Nessie.  
Similarly, if I anticipate something, it also 
does not exist; what I might experience in such 
anticipation is not what I anticipate. Harbouring 
an impatient desire to see Nessie, I anticipate 
seeing her upon reaching the lakeside. This 
anticipation may be so great as to induce a vivid 
picture of her as I stalk nervously through the 
reeds. Still, even if there is experience of 
something in this, it is not what I anticipate (to 
my disappointment). 
We have spoken so far about what we 
experience. However, much of what we 
commonly report as experiencing is not what we 
actually experience. I see the silhouetted side of 
a tree by the lake. I say ‘I see a tree’ not ‘I see 
this side of a tree’. In effect, I am not 
experiencing the tree in its entirety; I infer the 
entire tree from what I experience.  
Here, I will call what we correctly infer 
from what we experience indirect experience. 
There are, however, two important points about 
inference in general:  
(i) What I infer may be wrong. On seeing 
the silhouette of a tree thrashing in the wind, I 
think, ‘I’m seeing the Loch Ness Monster!’ In this 
case, I am mistaken; I am not experiencing the 
creature but imagining it.  
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(ii) I may seem to experience what I only 
infer. I may believe that I experience what I only 
infer from experience. To do so, I must 
experience something (from which I make this 
inference), but it is not what I infer it to be.3  
(iii) I may be compelled to infer what I 
report. In many cases, I may be consciously 
aware of my thought processes that lead me to 
infer something from what I experience. For 
example, I am consciously aware that, in seeing 
what looks like this side of a tree, I am inferring 
the tree. I may be wrong, of course, and if 
convinced otherwise (e.g. that the ´tree’s side’ is 
just a painting), I might be able to alter my 
inference.  
However, psychological research into 
perception strongly suggests that we sometimes 
automatically infer from what we experience to 
what cannot exist. Many theorists argue that this 
is the conclusion of an inferential process in the 
unconscious part of perception (see Gregory). In 
the precise terminology here, there is something 
in these cases which I only imagine; it need not 
exist for me to seem to experience it.  
The variety of such illusions is vast; to 
briefly mention examples, there is the illusion of 
depth (e.g. stereopsis; Gordon) or difference in 
length (e.g. the Muller-Lyer illusion; Gregory, 
Rookes and Wilson). In all such cases, people 
seem to experience what they could not be 
experiencing - and continue to do so even when 
they know this.  
If we are experiencing what we do in 
illusion even when there is depth and colour etc, 
then it seems as if the actual existence of depth, 
colour, motion etc. is unnecessary for what we 
experience. What we actually experience, then, 
is something else. It is just that, in non-illusory 
cases, we correctly infer from what we 
experience to what is in the world. Illusions are 
just where the process breaks down. 
Let us, however, turn back to the central 
question: Do we experience time? To answer 
                                               
3 This may happen because I have the wrong theory of experience. 
For example, I may be a naïve realist (e.g. Dancy), believing that I 
directly perceive objects in the world. Yet, the causal theory of 
perception may be true (e.g. Grice), objects in the world may only 
cause what I experience, not be what I experience. For example, I 
believe that I perceive a red fire engine ten metres from me. 
However, I do not experience it; I only experience an effect of light 
bouncing off the fire engine’s surface, striking my retina and 
causing the relevant neural processes. (For more discussion on this, 
see Gregory and Le Poidevin 2007). 
 
that, we must briefly describe what we might 
mean by ‘time’.  
 
2. Conceptions of Time 
Do we experience time? If so, what of it do we 
experience? We certainly sometimes talk as if 
we do:  
A. We talk of experiencing a period of 
time or duration, e.g. we experience the hour of 
a lecture or two weeks of a holiday. We even 
talk as if there are standard ways such durations 
feel but that they can vary: the lecture drags or 
the holiday flies by faster than a normal two 
weeks. 
B. We talk of experiencing temporal 
order, of one thing following another, e.g., we 
see someone come up to our house and then 
hear a knock at the front door.  
C. We also talk of experiencing a 
particular time or event in different ways, e.g., 
we perceive our tenth birthday as present and 
then remember it as past.  
At least, that’s what we might say we 
experience. But, do we really experience time in 
these cases? 
 
Absolute Time 
By ‘time’ we might mean absolute or 
independent time – that which, according to 
Newton, ‘of itself, and from its own nature, 
flows equably without relation to anything 
external’ (Newton, 6).  By independent is meant: 
this time flows even if everything else stops or 
nothing else exists.   
Many philosophers have argued that we 
could not experience independent time. 4 In 
order to do so, we would have to experience 
time without experiencing change (Shoemaker, 
67). Yet do seem to experience time even when 
there is no obviously changing thing, e.g., there 
is still a sense of time passing as we sit in a room 
on our own?  
Many philosophers and psychologists 
have suggested that, even in this case, a change 
is involved. They suggest we measure a change 
in what we might call a biological pacemaker. 
Any sense we have of ‘time’ is actually of a 
change in ourselves (see James (626), Ornstein 
and Le Poidevin 2004b).  
                                               
4 Though we may infer from what we do experience that there is 
such independent time (see Shoemaker and ʟe Poidevin 2004). 
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I will not dispute the claim that we never 
experience time by itself. This does not, 
however, mean that we do not experience time 
at all. We must experience at least some 
properties of time if we experience change.5 So, 
do we experience change?  
Let us define what is meant by change. Doing so 
also leads us into another debate about time. 
 
A-change and B-change 
We can see change’s dependency on time by 
giving a definition of change. What we accept as 
change depends on what we accept as time.  
Let us begin by suggesting a simple 
definition of change. It is just this: Something 
changes from being X to being Y by being X at 
one moment and Y at a later moment.  
Consider a ripening apple on a branch as 
it changes from green to red. If the apple really 
does change like this then, at one time, the 
apple is green and, at a later time, it is red.  
This differentiates change in something 
from a non-temporal difference in it. For 
example, the apple can vary in the colour of its 
skin without changing at all: one part of its skin 
is green while another is red. Neither this nor 
those we can experience this non-temporal 
variation is surprising.  
This might seem to be a sufficient 
definition of change. However, some 
philosophers claim that this is not real change at 
all. Real change, they claim, involves the passage 
of time.  
 
The Passage of Time 
The passage of time is the constant change of 
events from being future, to being present, to 
being past. It is the seemingly ceaseless change 
                                               
5 Time as a condition of change has been accepted by philosophers 
as far back as Kant. Kant considers time as a form of intuition - a 
necessary condition of all sensible experience; however, he does 
not accept it as something that exists independent of the human 
mind. It is only how the world appears (the phenomena) rather 
than how it really is (the noumena). (Kant, Strawson) 
One may be tempted to argue that, for the experience 
of time, when it comes to building models to explain it, we may 
only need to explain the appearance of temporal features rather 
than their existence.  
It must be stressed, however, that if we do this, then we 
cannot explain our experience in terms of processes or causal 
systems. Processes and causation presuppose change and 
temporal order. If temporal order is only apparent, processes and 
causal chains are only apparent; they do not really occur.  
For this reason, I do not explore this possibility (though 
others may find it fruitful to do so). 
in the tense of events. For example, your tenth 
birthday is constantly changing by becoming 
more and more past; the future death of the sun 
is constantly changing by coming nearer to being 
present.  
McTaggart presents a distinction which 
distinguishes this latter change from the earlier 
one. This distinction is in the A-series and the B-
series: 
Positions in time [...] are distinguished in two 
ways. Each position is Earlier than some, and 
Later than some, of the other positions. And 
each position is either Past, Present, or Future. 
[…] I shall speak of the series of positions 
running from the far past through the near 
past to the present, and then from the present 
to the near future and the far future, as the A 
series. The series of positions which runs from 
earlier to later I shall call the B series. The 
contents of a position in time are called events. 
(McTaggart, 24)6 
 
McTaggart argues that the A-series is essential 
to time but the B-series is not. Those who agree 
with his claim that a change in the temporal 
location of events is necessary for time are called 
A-theorists (e.g. McTaggart, Prior, Loizou, Lowe 
and Zimmerman). In contrast, those who hold 
that we only need the B-series order in events 
are called B-theorists (e.g. Le Poidevin, Mellor, 
Sider).  
According to A-theorists, the B-series is 
insufficient for real change. Speaking of the 
heating and cooling of a poker on different days, 
McTaggart writes that ‘this makes no change in 
the qualities of the poker. It is always a quality of 
that poker that it is hot on that particular 
Monday… [and always a quality that it] is not hot 
at any other time’ (Ibid, 27-28).  
Let us call A-series change A-change and 
B-series change B-change.7 Then, B-change is 
merely variation in an objects’ properties over 
time: apples turning from green to red, pokers 
heating and so on. A-change is the change in an 
event’s tense: my birthday becoming more past.8  
                                               
6 Similarly, Loizou states that an event ‘just is the bearer, one at a 
time, of a succession of tense-profiles.’(146)  
7 This distinction is similar to the distinction between first-order 
change and second-order change (Le Poidevin 2003, 16-17). In 
order to reinforce which change matches which I theory, I prefer 
the terminology here.  
8 There has been some significant discussion in the A/B-theory 
debate about how best to represent tensed change. Some A-
theorists argue that tensed change is not change in an event’s 
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Unfortunately, McTaggart also argued 
that A-change was impossible. In his infamous 
McTaggart’s paradox, he argued A-change either 
led to contradiction or an infinite regress 
(McTaggart). Despite its simplicity, I will not 
outline his argument here (but see Prior, Mellor, 
Lowe and Le Poidevin 2003). What is significant 
here are the positions other A-theorists assume 
in order to overcome it.  
There is two typical approaches: either 
insist that A-change is a ‘defeater-defeater’ of its 
opponents, i.e., so fundamental to our 
understanding that any denial of it should be 
rejected (e.g. Prior, Lowe) e.ɡ. Lowe argues that 
McTaggart’s paradox, even if it seems to work, 
must be flawed in some way because we are 
certain that there is A-change.9 (As for B-
theorists, who think we do not need genuine A-
change: they must only be badly confused, e.g., 
Loizou, Capek).  
 
Presentism 
Another approach to the paradox has been to 
insist on what contemporary philosophers call 
presentism. We can illustrate this position 
through a puzzle from St Augustine. 
Augustine asked: how could time exist? 
How could anything with duration exist? Perhaps 
surprisingly, he concluded that it could not. 
Briefly, his argument is this: On the one 
hand, the past and future can be said to have 
duration; however, they do not exist. On the 
other hand, the present has no duration; for if it 
did, no matter how short it might be, for any 
moment in it that is present, all the other 
moments of it would either be past or future; 
thus, they would not exist. Therefore, nothing 
has duration: whatever is present is too brief 
and the past and future are unreal.  
                                                                        
tensed properties. No such properties exist. Instead, the change 
involves tensed verbs. ‘The poker is hot in the past’ suggests a 
property of ‘being past’. We should say ‘the poker was hot’ which 
suggests no such thing (Prior, Zimmerman).  
I am unconvinced by the usefulness of such claims 
because I do not know how tensed A-change is supposed to be 
change if it is not at least a change in how something is – that is, at 
least in something or other’s properties. However, I will sometimes 
use tensed talk as a concession to these views. It does not, in my 
view, make the experience of A-change any more or less palatable. 
9 This is similar to Moore’s response to Hume’s claim that we 
cannot be certain that an external world exists. Moore responded 
that we are certain an external world exists; what we are less 
certain of is Hume’s argument (Moore, 137). 
Although we seem to measure duration, 
then, we must actually measure something else 
– for Augustine, something ‘in the mind’ 
(Augustine (265-267), Le Poidevin 2004b). In the 
terms of this paper, we only imagine a period of 
time; we never experience it.  
If you find this argument convincing, it is 
most likely because of the following intuitive 
assumption: only what is strictly present exists – 
‘strictly’ meaning no part of it is earlier or later 
than any other part. Whatever is at other times 
either no longer or has yet to exist. 
This intuitive position is presentism (e.g. 
Prior, 290; Bigelow, 35; Hinchliff, 126). However, 
it is not the only position. There is also 
eternalism: no matter what might be called the 
present, what is at any time is equally as real as 
what is at any other (e.g. Mellor, Le Poidevin, 
and Sider).  
The ontological significance of these 
positions is that which of them you hold 
determines what you consider to exist. If you are 
a presentist, only what exists now has any real 
existence. Thus, no matter how we talk or think, 
what occupies or occurs at two different times 
cannot both belong to or be part of anything 
real.  
If you are an eternalist, however, all 
times are equally real. Which moment is present 
is irrelevant to this. What exists at different 
times, then, might belong to or be part of an 
existing thing.10 
 
The Special Theory of Relativity 
While A-change and presentism might be prima 
facie motivated by our experience of time, the 
special theory of relativity casts doubt on their 
validity. 
The special theory of relativity denies an 
absolute present, past or future shared by 
spatially separated things; instead, it is only 
relative to velocities of objects.11 As Einstein puts 
it, ‘[…] ‘now’ loses for the spatially extended 
world its objective meaning.’ (Cited in Yourgrau, 
122). Yet, on any version of A-theory, including 
                                               
10This has generated a separate discussion regarding how things 
persist over time (see Sider for a partisan but thorough review). 
11 İt is more typical to say that it is relative to inertial references 
frames of objects. However, since an inertial reference frame is 
defined as the frame in which something is not moving, I have 
glossed over this issue here by referring to the velocities of objects 
(but see e.g. Mellor, Sider, Yourgrau).  
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presentism, present events are absolutely 
present, and so absolutely simultaneous.  
If we are A-theorists, real change is A-
change. If the single tense of spatially separated 
things is relative, real change of spatially 
separated things is relative. Similarly, if we are 
presentists, the existence of different things in 
different places is relative. Most philosophers 
who accept relativity find this absurd, e.g., Sider 
(45-52), Mellor. Gödel writes: ‘the concept of 
existence [...] cannot be relativized without 
destroying its meaning completely.’ (Cited in 
Yourgrau, 132) 
For special relativity, however, some B-
relations are not relative. These are the B-
relations defined by causation: one event is 
earlier than another because one event causes 
the other (Mellor). Thus, B-change that is causal 
change can be real in relativity. In addition, 
because relativity denies presentism, it affirms 
eternalism by default (Mellor, Sider).  
Thus, if A-change really is fundamental 
to the world, something must be wrong with 
relativity. Alternatively, if A-change is 
fundamental to what we seem to experience, 
but relativity is true, we suffer from a very deep 
illusion.  
 
B-theory’s Tense and Indexes 
Before we move on, let us revisit Augustine’s 
problem: if all but one moment of a duration is 
past or future, how can anything have duration? 
Given presentism, nothing can. But what about 
eternalism? 
A-theorist can be eternalists (e.g. Lowe, 
Capek, and Loizou). For an A-theorist, the past 
and future, being as real as the present, can 
have duration. However, it is still the case, 
however, that whatever is present does not: for 
the A-theorist, only one moment is the present.  
B-theorists do not hold that events are 
fundamentally past, present or future. Instead, 
they are derived from the more fundamental B-
relations. These B-relations connect a series of 
moments. A duration is a series of these 
moments and a B-change can occur over any 
such duration. Yet, how do we derive tense from 
this series?  
For B-theorists, tenses are defined by 
indexicals: they are defined by a time in the B-
series. This makes them similar to spatial 
‘properties’ such as here and there or above and 
below. Such spatial terms do not refer to 
fundamental properties of a point in space. They 
depend on the relation between that point and 
some location, whether it is another location or 
the point itself. For another location, it is ‘there’; 
for itself, it is ‘here’. 
With B-theory, tense is defined by the 
date. If the event is past, it is always past 
according to some time. If we pick another time, 
the event may be future or even present 
(Mellor, Le Poidevin 2003 (143-146), Sider, 
Callender). 
If a spatial point is within a large enough 
region, it can be both ‘here’ and ‘there’ without 
contradiction. It only depends, for each term, on 
the index own location, i.e., the region in which 
the index exists. Consider, for example, your 
body and two of its parts, your heart and your 
head. To your heart, your heart can be here 
while your head is there, and vice versa. 
However, according to your entire body, both 
are here.  
For tense, B-theory provides a similar 
analysis. As a result, the present can have 
duration. And so, a change in that duration can 
be present.  
For the B-theorist, one moment of a 
duration is past according to a second, later 
moment; and the later moment is future to the 
first, earlier moment. Yet, to the duration 
overall, both moments are present. If a duration 
can be present then a change can also be 
present. 
How we pick the present period of time 
is a separate question. A contemporary B-theory 
has been that it depends on what we experience 
of time. To answer that question, let us first start 
with a preliminary one: what do we seem to 
experience of time? 
 
3. Change We Seem to Experience 
We have discussed kinds of experience and 
conceptions of time and change. With these 
distinctions drawn, we can say the following: 
A. If we experience change, then there is 
change. This change is not inferred from what 
we experience, consciously or unconsciously, but 
just is what we experience. 
B. However, if we indirectly experience 
change, although it exists, we only infer it, 
consciously or unconsciously, from what we 
actually experience. If it seems that what we 
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experience is change, we only imagine it is 
change. Though we may correctly infer change 
from it, what we experience is actually 
something else. 
C. If there is no change at all, of course, 
we must only imagine there is change (no matter 
how compelling the change seems to be). 
In this section, we will examine what 
kinds of experience we seem to have of change 
and of what kind of change, A-change or B-
change, this may be. In doing so, we temporarily 
ignore what we may actually experience.  
 
Change through Memory 
As with time, we talk about experiencing change 
in some way. We see leaves changing colour 
over a season, hear the verse of a song follow 
the chorus and feel the vibration of a moving 
train. But do we directly experience these 
changes? For example: Do we see the leaves 
changing colour?  
The process of leaves changing colour is 
much too slow for us to see it. Such an 
experience seems to be a matter of perceiving it 
as yellow accompanied by remembering having 
perceived it as green. Dainton calls such an 
account of experienced change the ‘memory’ 
account of experience (Mellor, Dainton, Kelly).  
What is it that makes us aware of the 
change? Part of it is this: we remember having 
perceived the changed object before in a 
different state. Central to this memory is that we 
recognise this earlier state as being earlier than 
what we perceive and, more importantly, as 
something less immediate or direct as what we 
perceive. This raises a question: What if we were 
to fail to recognise what we experience in the 
memory as something we already experienced? 
What if, for whatever reason, we believed that 
this was the first time we experienced the green 
leaf?  
In such a case, it seems doubtful this 
would be an experience of a change in the leaf 
from being green to yellow. Instead, the 
‘memory’ of greenness would not seem to be a 
memory at all. If it seems to be anything, it is 
something we are imagining or perceiving.12 
                                               
12 Whether it seems to be imagined or perceived depends on 
whether we believe that we are experiencing a green leaf (rather 
than imagining one). It may be that anything we imagine is a 
construct from previous experiences. For example, if I imagine 
what it is like to stand in the heat of the Sahara, I can only draw on 
Importantly, if we fail to recognise that we 
experienced it before, that this is a re-
experiencing of sorts, then we will not infer from 
this memory that there has been change.  
The memory account has a problem 
however, one noticed by several philosophers 
(notably, Husserl, Dainton and most recently 
Kelly). There are cases of experienced change 
where we do not remember having experienced 
any of it before. This is where change seems 
much more directly experienced, with 
everything of it experienced for the first time. If 
this is true, then the memory model, at least as 
it is presented here, is insufficient. 
However, could this perception and 
memory be what we experience as the passage 
of time? Again, this is the change of events from 
being future to being present to being past. And 
this is a fundamental part of our experience.  
Mellor, as a B-theorist, certainly thinks 
this is adequate for the passage of time. He 
suggests that this passage is merely the 
accumulation of memories; and our awareness 
of these memories is sufficient for our sense of 
events receding into the past.13  
However, the passage of time is not just 
the tense of the event; it is the change in the 
tense. Although we may experience tense on 
remembering, and perhaps it is the tense of the 
event we remember, what we need, in order to 
experience the flow of time, is to experience the 
event’s change in tense. Do we experience that?  
Does this give us an experience of tensed 
change just through memory? It is if in the 
memory we experience the given event getting 
more past.  Consider your tenth birthday again: 
if you, by remembering it in some way, 
                                                                        
my memories of the hottest day I have ever felt (basically, an 
overcast autumn day in Barcelona). If this theory is correct, then in 
cases where we hallucinate or imagine something of which we do 
not remember the source, this is exactly the case that is being 
discussed here. We do not remember having ever perceived what 
we are now imagining. 
13 A very sparse sketch of this might be: from one time to the next, 
my store of remembered perceptions increases; and they increase 
in such a way that the order of their occurring to me is somehow 
represented in the storage mechanism; lastly, I am aware of this 
representation. (We will meet a similar model when we discuss 
retention theory).  
The model is sketchy because whether or not it accurately 
represents our awareness of the past is not at all clear; for 
example, do we really store the order of events? Research from 
Friedman on long-term memory casts doubt on this.  And Ornstein 
suggests that there is no evidence of anything in the brain 
resembling such a ‘store’.  
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experience it changing tense, then you 
experience an A-change. Do you do that? 
I do not think that this is anything like 
the experience of remembering: that we 
remember an event getting more past, i.e. 
changing tense. Instead, what we remember 
only seems past; it seems to be in the A-series. 
But this is not A-change.  
Therefore, it does not seem that we 
experience A-change in memory. However, 
memory is not the only kind of experience. 
Might we not perceive A-change? 
 
Perceptible change 
We have spoken about remembering that 
something has changed. However, many 
philosophers think that we also perceive change. 
(Dainton, Grush, Kelly, Le Poidevin 2007). 
Perception is usually associated with 
sensory experience, e.g., seeing, hearing, 
touching what we may call immediate things or 
events. Consider what you experience when you 
see or hear the following examples: a bird flying 
by overhead (from Dainton); the wail of an 
approaching siren becoming louder and higher 
pitched.  
These phenomena seem, at least, to be 
changes. And they seem to be perceived as 
directly as other seemingly perceived properties 
such as colour or shape: You see the bird change 
location; you hear the changing pitch and 
increasing volume; you perceive these as 
immediately as you see the bird’s colour or hear 
the siren’s piercing clarity. ‘If I hold my hand in 
front of me and rotate it at the wrist’ Dainton 
writes, ‘I see this rotation as clearly as I see my 
fingers.’ (Dainton, 114).14  
However, what kind of change is being 
perceived in these situations? Do we perceive A-
change in an event’s tense or B-change in an 
object’s qualities? 
Well, what is the natural way to describe 
a perceived change? Is it not this: of the bird (or 
                                               
14 If we perceive something (a change) which requires duration 
then we experience the duration. This is one motivation for the 
claim that our experience occurs in the specious present.  
The specious present is a common, even dominant, topic in the 
literature on the experience of time. However, the meaning of its 
terms sometimes (though certainly not always) lead to confusion, 
which I wish to avoid here. As a result, I will not use it. However, 
for helpful discussions, see James; Dainton; Le Poidevin 2007 (and 
also Le Poidevin 2004a for an interesting alternative definition). 
 
siren) as having, at one moment, one location 
(or pitch) and, at a later time, another location 
(or pitch). If so, then the natural way to talk 
about such perceived change is in terms of B-
change; not in a tense-changing event but a 
location- (pitch-) changing object. 
Perhaps, however, we more accurately 
capture the perceived change if we describe it in 
terms of A-changes. To do so, we must describe 
it in terms of events changing tense. For 
example, the change that is seen in the bird’s 
flight would be the change of tensed events, 
tensed happenings at a time, e.g., a tensed 
change in the bird being above us. Thus, we 
would better describe what we perceive as a 
change from:  
 
1. The bird will be above us.  
to 
2. The bird is above us.  
to 
3. The bird was above us.  
 
Yet, this kind of change does not seem to 
be what we experience at all. It is only a 
description of a single location of the bird 
repeatedly changing tense, not of the bird 
moving through several locations.  
We might modify the above statement 
by placing the successive locations into the 
description of the change. Assume the bird 
moves overhead from left to right and that we 
only experience whatever seems to be present 
or past. The A-theorist claim, then, is that we 
perceive a change from: 
4.  
5. The bird being to our left.  
to  
6. The bird having been to our left and 
being above us.  
to 
7. The bird having been above us, having 
been to our left before that and being to our 
right. 
 
This model of A-change resembles a 
currently debated theory of experienced time 
called retention theory, a theory developed from 
Husserl (Merleau-Ponty, Miller, Dainton, 
Gallagher, Grush and Kelly). Husserl’s analysis of 
experienced time is that, while having an 
experience of the world as it is now, we also 
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retain something from what has already been 
experienced. This retention process gives our 
experience of duration, persistence and change: 
‘We arrive at the idea of succession only if the 
earlier sensation does not persist unaltered in 
consciousness but [....] is specifically modified, 
that is, is continuously modified from moment to 
moment...’ (Husserl, 32).  
Retention theory might give us A-
change. Given it is true, experience seems to be 
of a continuous modification of retained events; 
this may be a modification of tense i.e. A-
change: ‘[F]rom moment to moment the content 
[…] seems to be shoved back more and more.’ 
(Husserl, Ibid) i.e. the retained event seems to 
become more past.   
  However, as Dainton points out, 
whatever this ‘shoving back’ is, it is not 
perceived change or persistence: ‘[ ]n the 
perception of a simple tone, our consciousness is 
remarkably clear: all we are aware of is the tone 
itself as an enduring auditory item.’ (Op. cit., 
p.157). Consider the bird’s motion above: do we 
experience a tensed A-change of a retained 
event? Do we not perceive just the bird moving 
from one place to the next? If it is the latter, the 
only thing ‘retained’ through the (B-)change is 
the bird in its flight.  
 
The Stream of Consciousness 
But then what would motivate us to think that 
we perceive A-change? One reason might be the 
next kind of experienced time: the stream of 
consciousness. 
Whatever our perceptions and 
memories may be of, they seem to be preceded 
and followed by an entire series of other 
experienced events. This succession of 
experiences is the stream of consciousness 
(James, Dennett, Flanagan, Dainton, and 
Blackmore).15  
A-change and retention theory may be 
describing how this stream seems. In doing so, 
they must mean that we are aware in some way 
of previous experiences and sensations as being 
                                               
15 This seems to be a ‘stream’ rather than a series of discrete 
bursts, i.e. like drops from a tap, because these experiences seem 
to flow from one to the next up until the present one; that is, their 
succession seems continuous. Such appearance of continuity 
motivates an alternative account of how it seems by Dainton: 
overlap theory, where (at least seemingly) later stages of one 
experience are the earlier stages of what follows it, and so on. (See 
Dainton, 244)  
retained and becoming more past. But is this 
retention and A-change how such a stream of 
experiences seem? 
You are reading this paragraph; consider 
what you just read before it. Does it seem that 
you retain something from what you have just 
read? Most likely – it probably seems that you 
could recall what you have read if you were 
prompted to. However, this capacity for 
recollection is not what retentions are supposed 
to be.  
For retentions, the question is: how does 
the previous reading of the paragraph seem to 
you? Does it not seem past, i.e., not present at 
all? That is not the recollection of what is in the 
paragraph; it is the act of reading it the first 
time. It does not seem to be something retained, 
like a ticket stub from a concert; it seems to be 
the original ticket. It is gone. 
But, is this something we do experience 
or just what we imagine? To answer that, we 
need to move from what we seem to experience 
to what we actually experience.  
 
4. Experienced Time 
This final section regards the question of what 
we do experience (rather than what we seem to 
experience). The answer depends on the 
conception of time and has implications for what 
we seem to experience.  
If our experience is not what it seems to 
be then we are misinterpreting what we 
experience. If we cannot help but seem to 
experience it this way, then we are under an 
illusion. It is true that we are under this illusion 
even if we infer correctly from it to something 
that is actually there.  
With that in mind, we can ask: What 
conceptions of time and change can give us what 
we seem to experience? Or do they all force us 
to merely imagine both?  
 
The Role of Retentions  
As discussed, Dainton denied that retention 
theory described how change seems to be. 
Gallagher, however, responds that retentions 
are not supposed to be what we seem to 
experience. They are parts of the actual 
structure of the experience (Gallagher, Section 
4).  Thus, they are part of how experiences of 
change are.  
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To get the experience of change, the 
following must happen: Given two successive 
experiences, something (whatever it might be) 
from the first is retained, that is, persists into the 
next experience.16 This retention is simultaneous 
with the rest of the latter experience and it is 
this simultaneous structure which gives the 
apparent change. As Grush puts it, an experience 
by retention is the ‘consciousness of not-now 
that is mediated by something that is now’ 
(Grush, 427). 
  However, this analysis means that an 
experience is not actually of change. The 
retentions and new elements are simultaneous; 
there is no time for change to occur. Thus, we 
can not directly experience change. If we seem 
to, it is an illusion; we imagine it. At best, we 
only infer change (consciously or unconsciously) 
from our experiences. 
That an experience has only 
simultaneous parts is what Miller calls the 
Principle of Simultaneous Awareness, PSA 
(Miller, see Dainton (133-6) for comment). If PSA 
holds, a theorist would need to explain an 
experience of change using something like 
retention theory. 
 
A-theory and Retention Theory 
If you assume presentism, you must assume PSA 
since what you experience must be at one 
moment because no two moments exist. In this 
case, it is no surprise that we cannot directly 
experience change.  
It seems as if A-theorist eternalists ought 
to hold retention theory as well. An objection 
from Kelly reveals why: If we experience a 
change we experience a duration; this means we 
are in ‘direct perceptual contact […] not only 
with what is now occurring but also with what 
has recently occurred and indeed with what is 
about to occur […]’ (2005, 9). Kelly claims that it 
is deeply implausible that we could ever 
experience such tensed events directly; how can 
our experience be of something that is no longer 
taking place or that is future? 
If A-theorists hold that we experience A-
change, they must somehow have it that we 
experience past and future events; otherwise, 
how could we experience the events changing 
                                               
16 Although altered as it persists; it is not as it was originally 
experienced (see Gallagher, Kelly for discussion). 
from being past and future? Yet it is not clear 
what this direct experience could mean.  
Does it, perhaps, mean memory? That is, 
our memory of events is a direct experience of 
past events. In remembering the birthday cake 
on the table of our tenth birthday, for example, 
we see the past cake past-being on the past-
table. How this cake looks, tastes and feels in 
our memory is the way the cake on that table, 
along with everything else happening at that 
time, is. This is how becoming past has changed 
it. Zimmerman likens them to strange ghostly 
entities (Zimmerman); further, it is unclear how 
we would be aware of such ghostly cakes and 
tables.  
Indeed, A-theorists have assumed that 
what we experience is present not past or 
future. If, however, what we experience is 
present as A-theorists understand it, then it is all 
at one moment.  Thus, we are in the same 
position as presentists regarding change. We 
may adopt retention theory and, thus, be able to 
infer change from what we experience, but it is 
still the case that any apparent change is 
something else that occurs all at one moment. 
 
B-theory and Retention Theory 
For the B-theorist, what is present, past or 
future is defined by a time. That time can be 
defined by what we experience. In addition, this 
time for the B-theorist can be a moment or a 
duration. As a result, we can experience a 
duration which is present.  
There is a problem, however, with saying 
we directly experience any duration of which we 
seem to be aware. Consider, for example, this 
experience described by Kelly: 
If you watch an airplane taking off from 
the runway you can follow its continuous motion 
for several minutes before it disappears. […you] 
must keep track of the earlier phases of long 
movements in some way other than by 
perceiving them directly (ibid, p.13).   
This seems to have the following 
problem. B-changes can not themselves change: 
if one thing comes before another or if 
something has certain properties at one time 
and not another, then it is always the case that it 
has that order or the properties at those times.  
Yet, our awareness of the earlier motion 
of the plane has changed even though the 
motion during that period cannot have changed. 
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Thus, something in our awareness of the earlier 
motion seems to have changed from then to 
now. But, given the order and the properties of 
the event cannot change, what can change? 
Must we be imagining change?  
I would reply that the change we 
experience is not completely imaginary. More 
specifically, given B-theory, we are mistaken 
about what is changing, some past event or 
perception of it, but we are not mistaken that 
we experience change. What we experience is a 
B-change. This apparent change associated with 
the past events is actually a change in us. The 
change is in a series of effects of previous 
perceptions, i.e., a B-change in a series of 
retentions within us.  
What, then, are these retentions? It is 
likely that this is something for cognitive science 
and empirical research to discover. However, 
perhaps the retentions are just the operation of 
the ‘pacemaker’ (discussed in §1). Thus, what we 
measure as the passing of time is also what 
seems to be the A-change of events; and it is a B-
theory change.  
Thus, unlike A-theorists and presentists, 
B-theorists can at least say we directly perceive 
change; we need not imagine or just infer it. 
Further, B-theory can also explain some of what 
seems to be A- change.  
 
Temporal illusion 
In this section, we will look at some empirical 
evidence that may support the view that, even if 
B-theory is true, we cannot be experiencing 
change (and thus time). 17 This evidence involves 
possible cases of temporal illusion, that is, 
experiences of change when there cannot be 
change.  
For example, there is the well-
documented phi phenomenon: A subject is 
presented with two spots of light at two 
different locations which are, one after another, 
briefly illuminated. Depending on how far apart 
                                               
17 We are concerned here with candidate temporal illusions of 
duration and change. For reasons of space, we do not discuss other 
illusions which may be related to time. For example, neither time-
lag (Houts, Le Poidevin 2007) nor succession perceived as 
simultaneity (Le Poidevin 2004a) is discussed here. This is not 
because there is nothing interesting to be said about these issues. 
However, the focus here is only on experiences which lead us to 
suppose we do experience change and duration.  
  
 
these spots are, and how quickly one follows the 
other, the two spots seem to be only one spot 
moving from one of their locations to the other. 
But there is no single spot in motion, rather 
there is just the successive flashes of light (Kölers 
(15, 178-179), Dennett (114-115), Gordon (74)). 
(I will return to a variant of this later). 
Similarly, the waterfall illusion seems to 
be of something flowing where nothing does 
(Crane, Bach) and the rotating snakes optical 
illusion seems to be of movement in a frozen 
image (Bach). Again, in these cases, what seems 
to be moving is not moving.  
However, all such illusions are 
unproblematic as experiences of change. These 
illusions at most demonstrate that we mistake a 
change to be happening in something which is 
not actually changing. However, it may still be 
explained as a change in something else. This 
makes it similar to the general solution to 
experienced A-change. In the A-change case, it 
seems that a past event changes when it does 
not; while in this case, it seems that an external 
event changes when it does not. In both cases, it 
is possible that something changes.  
However, the following illusions are 
more problematic for an experience of B-change. 
One variant of the phi phenomenon suggests 
that the order of the change we seem to 
experience cannot be that order. Here’s 
Dennett:  
[I]f the two illuminated spots were different 
in color […] what happened to the color of 
[the apparently single moving spot] as “it” 
moved. […] The answer [:] the first spot 
seemed to begin moving and then change 
color abruptly in the middle of its illusory 
passage toward the second location. 
(Dennett, 114) 
 
It seems as if the illusory colour-change 
only happens when the later spot occurs. This is 
because we experience a stage (the colour-
change) of a motion given what happens next 
(the later coloured spot).  However, if so, then 
either we know about what happens next, as we 
experience the illusory colour-change, or else 
the experience of that change is determined by, 
and thus happens after we are aware of the later 
stage.  
The first seems implausible as it implies 
an awareness of future states; we will not 
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explore its implausibility here. However, the 
second implies that the order of what we seem 
to experience - i.e., first, the ‘single’ spot at the 
first location; second, the spot’s colour-change 
while in motion; and third, the spot at the later 
location - is not the order of what we can 
experience. That is, what seems to be a change 
from one thing to another and on to another 
cannot be actually ordered that way. So, why 
suppose it is change at all? 
Dennett thinks the entire discussion is 
misled; rather than the actual event it seems to 
be, it is only a representation of it; thus, what we 
seem to experience need not be what we do 
experience. (Dennett, ibid). We might find this 
view tempting in this context; that is, though we 
seem to experience time and change, it is merely 
a representation. Perhaps a fallible retention 
system may be appropriate here, since such a 
system does not require actual experiences of 
change. However, considering how fundamental 
change is to experience, an alternative might be 
better. But is there one? 
If when we experience change via some 
sense, e.g. we see motion or hear a changing 
pitch, then the experience is partially 
determined by non-conscious processing via the 
same sense. For example, it is now generally 
accepted that there are two processing streams 
in the visual system (and indeed in other sensory 
systems as well), the ventral and dorsal streams. 
One, the ventral system, seems directly related 
to conscious experience and the other, the 
dorsal system, seems only indirectly related to it. 
Significantly, however, dorsal processing is more 
rapid than ventral processing; in addition, 
though it is indirect, it can affect our experience 
(Goodale and Milner).  
If this is true, a possible solution is 
available for experienced change. It is this: 
dorsal processing detects the later stage of the 
change before ventral processing gives rise to 
our experience. In doing so, it alters the ventral 
stream and thus the resulting experience. In 
other words, the dorsal stream’s detection of 
the later stage partially determines our 
experience of motion.  Where it corresponds to 
actual motion, this would be of that motion; but 
where there is no real motion, it results in 
illusions such as we see here.18 
Whether or not this explanation is the 
case needs further empirical research. In any 
case, the evidence so far does not commit us to 
holding that the temporal order we seem to 
experience must be an illusion. 
 
Illusions of Depth and Change: a comparison 
It may seem as if our apparent experience of 
change is as open to empirical refutation as 
other apparent experiences. However, this is not 
so. For to clearly demonstrate that we 
experience an illusion of something, we must 
first show we experience what seems to be it in 
its absence.  
In tereopsis (Gordon), two different 
two-dimensional images of scattered dots are 
presented to each of a subject’s eyes. The dots 
in each image are randomly generated. After a 
period of time, the subject reports experiencing 
a single image of dots scattered throughout a 
three-dimensional space before them. That is, 
they experience what seems to be depth. 
However, the subject is only seeing the two-
dimensional images and cannot be seeing depth 
as there is no depth there. Thus, what seems to 
be depth is not.  
Thus, we might say we do not 
experience depth, even if we seem to. Can we 
have a similar test for change?  
To do so, the following scenario would 
need to occur: we would need to experience 
change in the absence of change. Only then 
could we say that, whatever we are 
experiencing, it cannot be change.  
Just as one needs to see depth in a 
scenario where there is no depth, one would 
need to see change in a scenario where there is 
no change. This situation would be either a 
duration or an instant without change. Yet, both 
are controversial given the discussion so far.  
On the one hand, a duration without 
change is changeless time, i.e., the absolute, 
independent time which it is argued that we 
                                               
18 This suggestion is largely due to a paper presented by Valterri 
Astrila in the Consciousness and Time workshop in University of 
Edinburgh (April 1-3, 2008). Astrila’s solution is not exactly the 
same as it concerns the presence of feedback from visual region V5 
to V1 in both experiences of genuine and illusory motion. However, 
Astrila also concludes from it that what seems to be order need not 
be illusory.  
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could never experience or even know occurs 
(see §2 above). On the other hand, we would 
need to show that our experience of what seems 
to be change occurs in an instant. We have to 
say this given presentism or A-theory. However, 
amongst those who do not hold these views, 
that experience can occur at an instant is 
controversial (see Dainton and Le Poidevin 
2007).  
If we cannot get an uncontroversial 
changeless scenario, then that we seem to 
experience change is not open to empirical 
refutation.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We have talked about the different conceptions 
of time and how they relate to the way we 
explain our experience of change (and thus 
time). In closing, we briefly outline the 
implications from this discussion to neurological 
research.  
One issue for any investigator into 
consciousness is finding the correlates of 
consciousness (Hohwy). The time in which the 
correlates happen is generally thought to be the 
time in which the experience happens. An 
experience of change, then, occurs be when all 
the elements, the apparent stages, that seem to 
make the change occur. With retention theory, 
these apparent stages would be simultaneous. 
With the B-theory alternative, the apparent 
stages would genuinely be at different times.  
These alternatives imply very different 
neural structures for experiences of change. If 
you accept retention theory, you should seek, 
for each experience of change, a correlate with 
many simultaneous elements (and should expect 
to see a succession of such complex 
experiences). However, with B-change, the 
correlate need not have this structure at any 
moment in its existence. All that the correlate 
will look like is a change.  
Which should the researcher take on? I 
do not expect to answer this question here. At a 
guess, it depends on which of these fits with the 
best model of correlation. Prior to that, 
however, something might already be 
suggested:  
Of the two possibilities for change, the 
B-theory alternative is both simpler and closer to 
how our experience seems. Retention theory 
posits more complex entities than we seem to 
experience and, given presentism is false, there 
is no obvious need for retention theory.  
At least in this case, we could say: change is 
what it seems to be, and we experience change.  
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